Against the Realists and Pacifists

Contemporary interpreters of the just war theory have extended the principle of discrimination as a limitation on military action, to an absolute prohibition on any harm coming to noncombatants whatsoever. For example, Bertram identifies how some have argued that US action in Afghanistan would be illegitimate unless there could be a guarantee there would be no civilian casualties[1]. This view is closer to a form of deontological pacifism that condemns the very activity of war as intrinsically wrong. More particularly, the principal duty of justice violated by war is “not the duty not to kill aggressors, but rather the duty not to kill innocent, non-aggressive human beings”[2]. This approach has further consequences for the overall just war theory. If all killing of civilians is (something close to) murder, any war that leads to the killing of civilians is therefore unjust. Because every war involves civilian deaths, every war is therefore unjust. Pacifism “emerges from the very heart of the theory that is meant to replace it”[3].

Claims that a “presumption against violence” is at the root of the just war tradition cannot be sustained. Weigel argues that the just war tradition is a tradition of statecraft, where the resort to armed force is given moral sanction based on jus ad bellum considerations. To begin instead at a series of means tests that primarily deal with in bello questions of proportionality and discrimination is to begin at the wrong place[4]. The intent of the just war considerations for jus in bello conduct is to place necessary limits (discrimination and proportionality) on war, within the context of a just resort to war (jus ad bellum). Essentially, “a just war is meant to be, and has to be, a war that it is possible to fight”[5].

Further, the jus ad bellum is logically and morally prior to the jus in bello considerations. To place an absolute priority on questions of discrimination in the form of noncombatant immunity breaks the link between just war thinking and statecraft built on the foundations of justice, as Weigel notes. In the discussion of the US decision to respond to the 9/11 strikes by attacking Afghanistan, confusing these differences influenced an outlook that was:

…so single-mindedly focused on noncombatant immunity prior to the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda that the question of the moral necessity of a vigorous response to the Taliban / al-Qaeda nexus in defence of the United States…seemed to drop out of the picture[6].

The tradition is turned inside out by when precedence is given to questions of discrimination and proportionality over what are the logically prior deliberations of jus ad bellum: just cause, right intention, competent authority, reasonable chance of success, proportionality of ends, and last resort. The moral obligation of government to pursue national security in the face of unjustified aggression is what establishes the foundation from which issues of conduct are sourced.

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[1] Christopher Bertram. “Afghanistan: A Just Intervention”. Imprints: Journal of Analytical Socialism 6, No 2 (2002) Accessed 31^st October 2006 from http://eis.bris.ac.uk/~plcdib/imprints/bertram.html

[2] Orend, War.

[3] Michael Walzer. Arguing About War. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 13.

[4] Weigel, George. “Moral Clarity in a Time of War”, First Things 128, (January 2003), 2-27. Retrieved on 12^th November 2006 from http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0301/articles/weigel.html.

[5] Walzer, Arguing About War, 14.

[6] George Weigel, “Just War: An Exchange”First Things 122 (April 2002), 31-36. Retrieved on 31^st October 2006 from http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0204/articles/justwar.html