The Just War Theory

The “just war” approach is foremost a tradition of statecraft that attempts to define morally worthy political ends[1]. Its core proposition is that states can resort to armed force and be moral justified in doing so. Just war describes the conditions under which war can be regarded as fully moral and just, “an ethically appropriate use of mass political violence”[2]. This is not an appeal to expediency but to justice. However, the term just war can itself be misleading, as it may imply the moral perfection of one side and guilt of the other. It is more properly understood as justifiable war, that is, the process of moral decision-making applied to war must be ongoing, and is a relative, admitting good and evil on both sides of the conflict[3]. While just war theory attempts to distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable use of force, “realism” is sceptical about the application of moral terms, such as justice, to the activities of states. States must act in their own vital interests in matters of foreign policy, national security, and economic growth, and appeals to moral ideals are irrelevant. The ‘morality’ of warfare is thus a category error, as it has unrelated to the virtual anarchy of international politics, where actions in the real world often reflect the famous maxim of Thucydides, “the strong do as they can while the weak do as they must”[4]. The argument against the realists in favour of the treatment of war as a moral condition, and that morality holds for state actors as well as individuals, is offered in more detail by Walzer[5].

Given that war is subject to moral scrutiny, the just war approach to this kind of inquiry can broken down into its two constituent elements. The justice of war (jus ad bellum) “requires us to make judgements about aggression and self defence” [6] and may lead to the conclusion that war is sometimes justifiable – a proposition denied by some pacifists who believe that war is a criminal act. The law of war (jus in bello) subjects the conduct of war to moral criticism, necessitates decisions “…about the observation or violation of the customary or positive rules of engagement”[7]:

More fully, the jus ad bellum (right to go to war) criteria are usually listed as: just cause; right intention; legitimate authority; last resort; probability of success; and proportionality between good and bad outcomes[8] [9] [10]. All six criteria must each be fulfilled for a particular declaration of war to be justified. The first three of these six rules are deontological (duty-based or first principle) requirements. For just cause to be established, the duty not to commit aggression must be violated. Further duties must be respected to justify the response of war: appropriate motivation and the public declaration by the properly constituted authority. The next three requirements are consequentialist: having met these “first principle” requirements, the expected consequences of launching a war must also be considered. Thus, just war theory attempts to apply to the issue of war both deontology and consequentialism in a pragmatic way[11]. As Moseley argues, just war theory “bridges theoretical and applied ethics, since it demands an adherence, or at least a consideration of meta-ethical conditions and models, as well as prompting concern for the practicalities of war.”[12] The jus in bello component of the just war tradition is logically independent, although can be said to exist in a dualistic tension[13] as it derives from a similar set of concerns and origins. It likewise has to do with the restraint or limiting of war, but only once it has begun. Two broad principles define jus in bello considerations: discrimination (or noncombatant immunity); and proportionality. The principle of discrimination concerns who can and cannot be legitimately targeted in war, whilst the principle of proportionality concerns how much force is morally appropriate. Both serve to limit destruction to the extent militarily necessary.

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[1] George Weigel. Moral Clarity in a Time of War, First Things 128 (January 2003), 2-27. Retrieved 12th November 2006 from http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0301/articles/weigel.html

[2] Brian Orend, “War” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 12^th November from 2006 http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/entries/war/

[3] James T Johnson. Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry. (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1981), xxxiv.

[4] Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, LXXXIX Retrieved 12^th November 2006 from http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Thuc.+5.89

[5] Michael Walzer,. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Considerations. (New York: Basic Books), 1977.

[6] Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 21.

[7] Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 21.

[8] Bruce Duncan. “War in Iraq: Is it Just?” Catholic Social Justice Series 47 (2003), 44.

[9] United States Conference of Catholic Bishops: Office of Social Development and World Peace. Letter to President Bush on Iraq. Retrieved on 12^th November 2006 from http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/bush902.htm

[10] Richard D Land. Letter to President Bush. Retrieved on November 12^th 2006 from http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Land_letter. Known as the Land Letter and published by US Evangelicals, it shows how these same criteria can be used to come to an entirely opposite conclusion.

[11], Brian Orend, “War” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved on November 12^th 2006 from http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/entries/war/

[12]Alexander Moseley. Just War Theory [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]. Retrieved on November 12^th 2006 from.http://www.iep.utm.edu/j/justwar.htm

[13] Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 21.